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Abstract—Shibboleth is an architecture and protocol for 
allowing users to authenticate and be authorized to use a 
remote resource by logging into the identity management 
system that is maintained at their home institution.  With 
Shibboleth, a federation of institutions can share resources 
among users and yet allow the administration of both the 
user access control to resources and the user identity and 
attribute information to be performed at the hosting or 
home institution.  Subversion is a version control repository 
system that allows the creation of fine-grained permissions 
to files and directories.   In this project an infrastructure, 
Shibbolized Subversion, has been created that consists of a 
Subversion repository with an Apache web interface that is 
protected by a Shibboleth authentication system. The 
infrastructure can allow authorized and authenticated data 
sharing between institutions yet retains simplicity and 
protects privacy for users. In addition, it also relieves local 
administrators from the task of having to perform extra 
account management for users from other institutions.  This 
paper describes the Shibboleth and Subversion systems, the 
implementation of the file sharing infrastructure, and issues 
of attribute maintenance, privacy and security. 
 
Index Terms—Fine-Grained Access Control, 
Authentication, Authorization, Shibboleth, Subversion 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
 Educational and research activities are not confined to 
a single institution, but are performed collaboratively 
among cooperating institutions across the country or even 
around the world.  As a result, there is a need for the 
development of resource sharing infrastructure between 
geographically separated institutions under different 
administrative domains.  For example, it is not 
uncommon for a group of scientists from several 
institutions to collaborate on a proposal, or for a group of 
educators, also from several different institutions, to 
collaborate on the development of course or training 
materials.   The documents that are developed need to be 
shared among the project participants in an authorized 
and easy-to-use manner.  The focus of this project is to 
develop a system for sharing documents such as data 
files, code, research papers, proposal documents, course 
materials, and others, in an authorized manner within a 
collaboration group of individuals from two or more 
institutions.  
 It is relatively easy to allow several users to have 
general access to a repository by providing individual 
accounts to that repository. It is also relatively easy, given 
that accounts have been set up, to provide fine-grained 
access for individuals or groups at the directory or file 
level using standard Unix or database access permissions. 
However, the administration of the system, including the 
maintenance of individual user accounts and permissions 
for various levels of group access, becomes much more 
complex and difficult if the number of users is increased 
to several hundred, if these several hundred user accounts 
are changing continuously, and if the user accounts are 
spread across several institutions. Even the simplest case 
typically requires solving a number of non-technical 
difficulties.  For example, suppose that a group of 
researchers at University A need to access data at 
University B.  In general to allow this access may require 
a long distance call, working across different time zones 
with different work load and schedules, and navigating 
different internal politics. A fine-grained access control 
method that allows a certain degree of independence for 
both the resource provider and resource users is needed.  
 The provision of a system for document sharing must 
address issues such as user account management, access 
control of the shared data, and ease of usage. The system 
must allow a degree of simplicity for both administrators 
and users, and must have an authorization system flexible 
enough to allow fine-grained access control at the user 
and group level.  
 To address these issues, a shared repository system has 
been created with the following characteristics: 
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 • The system is a shared repository with open access for 
trusted institutions. 
• The test of authentication of a user’s identity is 
separated from the test of authorization to access with 
certain privilege any particular file or directory in the 
repository. 
• No additional identity provider is required for the 
group of cooperating institutions or individuals.  
Authentication is done by each individual’s institution 
using the login name and password that is provided to 
the individual by the home institution. 
• Authorization is performed by matching user attributes 
with resource properties.  User attributes are 
administrated at the home institutions along with the 
user’s local institution accounts.  Resources properties 
are maintained by the administrators of the target 
repository resources.  
• The degree of fine-grained access control can be 
manipulated as needed.  
• Basic requirements such as security and authenticity 
are guaranteed.   
• The system also allows a user to access a repository 
without revealing personally identifying information, if 
this capability is allowed by the resource administrator. 
• The system can be run on different platforms and no 
extra installation is required on the client side. 
 This repository system addresses communication and 
administration issues between the resource provider of 
the shared repository systems and the administrators in 
the authenticating institutions. The constructed document 
sharing system utilizes the existing identity providers 
from different institutions in order to further understand 
the difficulties of working in a federated community. 
II. BACKGROUND 
 The system that has been developed is based on 
Subversion, a well known open source document 
repository system, and on the Shibboleth open source 
system for managing federated access to shared 
resources.  This section gives background on version 
control systems, including Subversion in particular, and 
Shibboleth.  The section also discusses the nature of 
access control architectures.   
A. Version Control Systems  
 Version control systems have been used historically in 
the engineering and software development environments 
to manage the development of source code and other 
engineering documents associated with the development 
process.  A version control system typically allows a user 
to “check out” a document for either read or write access.  
If a document is checked out for write access then, at 
minimum, other participating members of the group will 
be alerted to the possible change and can avoid making 
modifications to the document at the same time.  Typical 
features of a version control system include the ability to 
check out documents, synchronize different changes from 
different users to a document, and reverse these changes 
back to an earlier version of the document.  
 A number of version control systems are commonly 
used, including Revision Control System (RCS) [1], 
Project Revision Control System (PRCS) [2], Concurrent 
Version System (CVS) [3], and Subversion [4].  
 Subversion is an open source version control system. 
Subversion has many features similar to a traditional 
version control system and overcomes some limitations 
of traditional version control systems. One of the new 
features of Subversion is versioned metadata, which plays 
an important role in the shared repository system 
developed here. Metadata is information about a file such 
as file name or access permissions.  With versioned 
metadata, a set of properties can be assigned for each file 
and directory of the repository in the form of keys and 
their values. Furthermore, these properties can also be 
versioned, which means that access permissions can be 
tracked over time to see which groups or users have 
historically had access to files and directories.  Due to 
this characteristic, Subversion was chosen to be the 
repository in this storage system. 
B. Shibboleth 
   Shibboleth is a project of the Middleware Architecture 
Committee for Education (MACE) [5] and offers a 
powerful, scalable, and easy-to-use solution for 
authentication and authorization access control. 
Shibboleth has been under development since 2001, is a 
stable tool, and has been incorporated into National 
Science Foundation's Middleware Initiative (NMI) 
Release 9 [6]. The Shibboleth system is able to: 
• Utilize existing campus identity and access 
management infrastructures to authenticate individuals 
and then send information about them to a resource site.  
The resource provider can set policy and make an 
authorization decision based on the information that is 
provided by the campus identity and attribute 
information systems. 
• Support collaborations between campuses, 
organizations, and off-campus vendor systems. 
• Authenticate and authorize based on attributes only.  It 
is possible to allow access without revealing a user’s 
identity, which allows the user’s privacy to be protected 
if this is desired.  
Shibboleth consists of three main components: the 
Identity Provider, the WAYF (Where Are You From) 
server, and the Service Provider. Also, the system 
requires the existence of a certificate authority that is 
trusted among all components.  The steps of the 
Shibboleth protocol are described next, followed by a 
more detailed discussion of each of the components of the 
Shibboleth architecture. 
 B.1. Shibboleth Protocol.  The steps of a Shibboleth 
session are illustrated in Figure 1.  The steps are 
numbered and labeled using the underlying HyperText 
Transport Protocol (HTTP) commands (e.g., GET, 
POST) and proceed as follows:  First, the user contacts a 
Target Resource that is protected by Shibboleth (Step 1).   
In this step the user uses a browser to access a web site 
that is has been enabled to use Shibboleth for 
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 authentication and authorization.  The Target Resource is 
illustrated in the box labeled “Server Provider”.  
 In the next series of steps, the Service Provider 
component redirects the user to the WAYF server so that 
the user can select a local institution with which to 
authenticate (Steps 2, 3, 4, and 5).  The WAYF is 
configured with the names of all institutions in the virtual 
organization and also the corresponding Internet address 
of the Identity Provider of each institution.  The user 
selects his or her home institution and the underlying 
software redirects the user request to the Identity Provider 
of the chosen institution (Step 6).  The user is prompted 
to enter a login name and password for the institution 
(Step 7). After authentication, the Single Sign-on Service 
(SSO) at the home institution confirms the identity of the 
user and returns a handle to the Service Provider that 
identifies the user for the remainder of the session (Steps 
8 and 9).  
 After the user is authenticated, a separate step is 
performed to determine if the user is authorized to use the 
requested resource.  Using the session handle, the Service 
Provider requests the required attributes of the user from 
an Attribute Repository (not shown in the figure).  The 
Attribute Repository may be maintained at the user’s 
home institution, or may be maintained by a virtual 
organization for a group of resources that are shared 
within the virtual organization.  The request for attributes 
is shown in Step 10. The release of particular attributes 
can be allowed or denied based on how the user or the 
administration has set attribute release policies.   
 Finally, the Service Provider receives the attributes 
(Step 11).  An Assertion Consumer service component of 
the Service Provider compares the user’s attributes with 
the resource requirements.  If the attributes match the 
requirements then the user is authorized to use the 
resource (Step 12). 
 The identity provider and attribute repository used in 
this project consist of a single server.  In particular, the 
server is a test LDAP server that mirrors the capabilities 
of the local campus LDAP server of the University of 
Arkansas. The test Identity Provider is used to avoid 
implementing untested attributes into the campus main 
authentication server. Trusted communication is 
established to other identity providers, including the local 
campus LDAP server at the University of Arkansas and 
the identity provider at the University of Missouri. The 
tradeoffs in using a single server for both the identity 
provider and the attribute repository will become more 
clear in the section on the EduPerson schema.  While not 
using a separate attribute repository reduces many of the 
technical tasks of administration and configuration, this 
strategy creates several difficulties in communicating and 
agreeing about unique attribute settings between the 
service provider and the identity providers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of Shibboleth Architecture [5] 
 
B.2. Server Certification. The Shibboleth protocol 
depends on the existence of a trust relationship between 
the various components of the Shibboleth architecture, 
including each Service Provider and each Identity 
Provider.  In Shibboleth this trust is typically guaranteed 
through the use of a common Certificate Authority (CA).  
Each component acquires a certificate that is signed by 
the common CA The Bossie Certificate Authority created 
by the University of Wisconsin is used in this project [7].  
 The Bossie CA provides a very minimal level of trust, 
but this level of trust is sufficient for the prototype testing 
for the components in this project.  A Bossie certificate 
was installed at the Identity Provider at the University of 
Missouri. However, the Identity Provider at the 
University of Arkansas, which is based on the local 
campus LDAP server, uses commercial Verisign 
certificates. With only these installed certificates the 
Arkansas Identity Provider did not trust the Missouri 
Service Provider and queries from it failed.   This 
problem was resolved for the prototype testing by 
manually adding the Bossie server certificate of the 
Missouri Service Provider into the key store of the local 
campus LDAP server.  
B.3. Shibboleth Service Provider. The Subversion 
Repository is configured as a Shibboleth Service 
Provider. When a user contacts the repository, the request 
is forwarded to the Identity Provider for authentication 
purposes. After being authenticated, the Service Provider 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
L
I
E
N
T 
Identity Provider 
 
WAYF 
Authentication 
Authority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Service Provider 
 
SSO Service 
Assertion Consumer 
Service 
Target 
Resource 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
80 JOURNAL OF SOFTWARE, VOL. 2, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2007
© 2007 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
 processes the attributes returned by the Identity Provider 
for authorization/access control. A Service Provider 
contains three components: Target Resource, Assertion 
Consumer Service, and Attribute Requester.  
 Target Resource: The Target resource is the resource 
that is protected by Shibboleth. As of the current release, 
Shibboleth only supports web-based applications. That is, 
the resource has to be accessible through an Internet 
browser. However, a bridge connection can be created to 
map between a web browser and a command line based 
resource. 
 Assertion Consumer Service: The Assertion Consumer 
Service is the counterpart of the Single-Sign On (SSO) 
Service on the Identity Provider side, except that it is 
located on the Service Provider side. This service 
processes the authentication assertion from the Identity 
Provider’s SSO Service. After the authentication between 
the two sites has been established, it continues with 
issuing the optional attribute request and then proceeds to 
authenticate and authorize the users based on the result of 
this attribute request. 
Attribute Requester: The Attribute requester is a SAML 
based attribute request mechanism that queries the 
Identity Provider for the attributes needed in order for the 
user to be authorized and authenticated. Once mutual 
authentication has been established between the Service 
Provider and the Identity Provider, this communication 
can be done with a back-channel attribute exchange. This 
request is optional depending on the security level of the 
target resource.  
 The installations of the Shibboleth Service Provider 
and its prerequisites are straightforward. However, 
configuration between the Service Provider and the 
Identity Provider is complicated and may require several 
emails and telephone conversations between 
implementers and administrators among the participating 
sites.   The advantage of Shibboleth is that once the 
installation is complete and the attributes have been 
agreed upon, then continued user maintenance and 
resource configuration can be done independently by 
local administrators. 
B.4. WAYF (Where Are You From). A WAYF server is a 
server listing the Identity Providers that the Service 
Provider trusts. After contacting the Service Provider, the 
user’s request is forwarded to a WAYF server. Here, the 
user must choose an associated Identity Provider. After 
selecting an Identity Provider, the request is forwarded 
again to the chosen Identity Provider in order to perform 
authentication. Two WAYFs are used in this project, 
including a local WAYF created previously for the 
WebMPI project [8], and a federated WAYF created by 
the Shibboleth MACE for the InQueue Federation, a 
public federation for testing purpose [9].  
B.5. Shibboleth Identity Provider. The Identity Provider 
is the located at the user’s local institution. Without 
revealing to the Service Provider the identity of a user, 
the Identity Provider will guarantee to the Service 
Provider that the user is legitimate. Upon request, the 
Identity Provider forwards a list of user attributes to the 
Service Provider. These attributes have been previously 
approved by the users for authorization purposes only. 
The Service Provider determines, based on these 
attributes, whether the user is authorized to access 
selected data in the repository. The Identity Provider of 
Shibboleth consists of four components: the 
Authentication Authority, the Attribute Authority, the 
Single-Sign-On (SSO) Service, and the Artifact 
Resolution Service. 
 Authentication Authority: The authentication authority 
is used to issue authentication statements for the parties 
participating in the communication process. This 
component is integrated with the local authentication 
system and depends on the setup of the local system.  
 Attribute Authority: The attribute authority processes 
attribute requests [5]. That is, it receives attribute requests 
from the Service Provider and processes these requests 
based on the release permissions given by users. All the 
requests are in the form of Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML) messages and utilize Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS) or SAML 
message signatures for mutual authentication [5].  
 Single-Sign-On (SSO) Service: The SSO Service is the 
location to which users are directed by the Service 
Provider. This module performs authentication between 
the users and their local institutions. After this process, 
users are directed through a transfer service back to the 
Service Provider or to an error page depending on the 
authentication. This service is not a SAML service but an 
HTTP resource [5]. 
 Artifact Resolution Service: Artifact Resolution 
Service is a SAML protocol [5] that binds the end-point 
controlled by the Identity Provider in order to resolve a 
SAML authentication assertion into corresponding 
assertions from the requests of the Service Provider.  
 In this project, the Identity Providers are hosted by the 
member institutions of the Great Plain Network (GPN) 
[10].  
C. Fine-grained access control 
C.1. Access control methods. An access control system 
consists of an access control policy and an access control 
mechanism. Normally, these two components both 
belong to the central administration under the form of an 
access control list for policy and a mechanism to match 
users with this list. However, this practice also carries 
several serious shortcomings: 
• Scalability is an issue when the number of users 
increases. 
• There is extra administrative burden in maintaining 
attributes for users from other institutions. 
• Adding and removing users can be slow due to the 
communication delay between institutions, which can 
lead to reduced productivity as well as security leaks.  
• Privacy of users can be compromised when attributes 
are released to Resource Providers. 
 Shibbolized Subversion is based on Attribute Based 
Access Control (ABAC) [11]. Shibboleth allows the 
exchange of attributes between its identity provider and 
target provider, and these attributes are from the user’s 
account on the identity provider side. In this method, the 
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 Subversion directories are marked with specific 
properties. Only users whose attributes match with these 
properties can access the directories. While still 
maintaining the same level of security as traditional 
access control methods, this method divides the burden of 
controlling authorization evenly between user side and 
repository side. Also, this method gives administrators on 
the repository side the ability to approve or deny specific 
access by users or by specific types of users to their own 
resources. Since Subversion allows the creators of the 
data in the repository to actively modify the properties of 
these data, access to these data can be controlled by the 
creators down to the file or directory level. Hence, 
besides providing fine grain access control, ABAC also 
encourages an equal participation of both sides, the 
Resource Provider and the Identity Provider in the access 
control process.  
C.2. EduPerson. For resources that are being shared to a 
large community, it is also to the benefit of the resource 
provider to have a set of common attributes that can be 
easily categorized and distinguished. Among the 
Shibboleth participants, the most popular attribute 
scheme is EduPerson, which is the default scheme in 
Shibboleth’s AAP.xml file. It defines a series of fields 
that are most relevant to the academic environment, and 
these fields are object class definitions for LDAP servers. 
Several fields in the EduPerson schema are used for 
authorization purposes in this project:  
 eduPersonPrimaryAffiliation:  This field provides the 
name of the identity provider that the user is associated 
with. .  
 eduPersonScopedAffiliation:  This field identifies the 
role of the user within the identity provider. Such role can 
be staff, student, or administrators, etc. 
 eduPersonEntitlement:  This field contains the access-
control attributes. As described in EduPerson 
specification, this field accepts attributes with multiple 
values. Consequently, attributes to describe different 
levels of access control can be applied. 
 eduPersonTargetedId:  This field contains a unique ID 
that represents the user, instead of the normal login name. 
This is to satisfy the requirement of protecting the 
identity of the user, yet provide means for the service 
provider to backtrack and report to the identity provider 
in the case of malicious usage. Usually, this ID can be an 
encrypted combination of several attributes of the user. 
 The fields discussed above are the ones recommended 
by the InQueue [12] and InCommon [13] federations. 
Depending on the institutions, more fields can be added 
to further describe the personal attributes of the users. 
However, the more information is required from the 
users, the better the security and privacy policy has to be 
in order to prevent legal complications.  
 
 
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 Shibbolized Subversion has been implemented with 
three main separate modules: the browser interface, the 
connection scripts, and the repository. These modules are 
loosely connected by function calls among themselves, 
and the infrastructure can change without affecting the 
whole system as long as the interfaces are kept the same. 
Figure 2 illustrates the overall structure of the 
Shibbolized Subversion system.  
A. Browser Interface and Security 
 The browser interface for Shibbolized Subversion is 
created using Perl CGI and HTML. The main purpose of 
this module is to provide a simple and easy-to-use 
interface for users while still retaining most of the 
important commands of Subversion. There are currently 
five basic Subversion commands implemented in this 
interface: check out, add, update, status, and commit.   
 
 
Figure 2: Shibbolized Repository System 
 
A.1. Browser interface structure. The websites of the 
Shibbolized Subversion user interface are designed using 
Perl CGI. However, most of the HTML code is embedded 
in the local scripts called by the CGI programs so that the 
system can display HTML as well as perform local 
functions seamlessly. Although these CGI programs carry 
the initial HTML web page, most of the internal displays 
of the pages are controlled by the local scripts. 
Furthermore, the CGI programs have the responsibility of 
maintaining many default inputs for the local scripts such 
as name and path of the repository and access control 
attributes.  
A.2. External security. The browser interface performs 
the function of providing external security of the system.  
External security provides the access control and 
authentication for the repository. The primary 
responsibilities of external security are: 
• Authenticate the users with their Identity Provider, 
• Provide the users with secured connection for the 
exchange of password and attributes, and 
• Pass the users’ attributes to internal security for access 
control decisions.  
 These responsibilities are implemented using 
Shibboleth as an Apache security module for the website. 
The Shibboleth structure provides identification, 
authentication, authorization, and accountability [14]. 
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 With Shibboleth, identification and authentication are 
guaranteed by the Identity Provider to make sure that the 
users are indeed members of the campus organizations 
and that they are who they say that they are as provided 
by the users’ password. Furthermore, attributes of the 
users that are passed by the Identity Provider to the 
Service Provider allow access control decisions to be 
made. Finally, since these attributes are permitted to be 
impersonal, the privacy of the users may be protected if 
that information is not required by the resource.  
B. Local Scripts and Internal Access Control 
 The version of Shibboleth’s attribute assertion system  
used in this project only functions with Web applications 
[15]. Subversion repository content can be displayed on 
web pages using Apache’s WebDAV.  However, only 
read access can be performed on the web-based 
Subversion repository. Subversion can only achieve its 
fullest potential when being accessed with the command 
line interface. As a result, a mechanism to connect the 
functionalities of Shibboleth and Subversion is needed. In 
order to solve this problem, a series of local shell scripts 
have been used to perform the following functions: 
• Receive the attributes passed from Shibboleth 
• Perform Subversion commands based on the policies 
dictated by these attributes  
• Display the results of the Subversion commands to a 
web page 
B.1. Attribute passing. The attributes are acquired from 
the Identity Provider and passed to HTML in the form of 
HTML headers. For example, the attribute 
eduPersonScopedAffiliation can be accessed by the 
header of HTTP_SHIB_EP_AFFILIATION. For the 
prototype system, there are three eduPerson attributes that 
are requested from the Identity Provider: 
ScopedAffiliation, Entitlement, and TargetedID. While 
ScopedAffiliation and TargetedID are used to help create 
a unique workspace for the user, Entitlement contains all 
the information concerning the authorization level of the 
user. After being authenticated, a workspace is created 
for the user by creating a directory whose name is the 
concatenation of the values returned for ScopedAffiliation 
and Entitlement. From then on, every command and data 
access related to the user is performed within this 
directory only. This information is written into a 
temporary policy file for later use by the local scripts. A 
system call from the CGI program passes the values of 
ScopedAffiliation and Entitlement, and the directory to be 
checked, out to the scripts.  
B.2. Performance of Subversion commands. In processing 
a Subversion command from the users, the local scripts 
go through three steps:  1) check out the directory, 2) 
match user attributes with directory’s properties, and 3) 
process the Subversion command. 
 All of these Subversion commands require an existing 
checked out version of the data. Therefore, a “svn 
checkout” call is needed initially. Immediately after this 
call, although the data files and directories are now 
available, the user has no knowledge of the data. One of 
the limitations of this method is that, if the users do not 
specify a single directory, the check out script will check 
out a complete repository database. This will affect the 
speed of the attributes matching process and take up a 
larger than normal amount of disk space. The first 
disadvantage of this method can be reduced by having a 
large server disk (the checking out process is done 
completely on the server side). The second disadvantage 
can be limited by allowing the user to delete the extra 
data after the copy of the needed document to the local 
machines is finished. After the data is checked out 
initially, the authorization process with attribute matching 
is started.  
B.3. Attribute matching. In Shibbolized Subversion, the 
attribute matching process is divided into two steps: 
match-attribute and authorize-attribute. Also, in order to 
simplify the matching process, the following assumptions 
are made: 
• If a user has read access to a folder, he automatically 
has read access to all the recursive folders and files 
within that main folder. 
• If a user has write access to a folder, it does not mean 
that he has read access to that folder. In short, read and 
write access capabilities are two different attributes with 
equal importance and are granted independently from 
each other.  
• Read access is checked on files and folders, while 
write access is only checked on folders. 
 Using a system of hooks implemented within 
Subversion, a repository’s files and folders can each be 
attached with multiple attributes. During the matching 
process, these attributes will be recorded in a temporary 
policy control file to determine read/write access.  
 When a user’s attributes are passed to the script, they 
are first compared against the attributes attached to the 
checked out directory. If a match is found, the appropriate 
HTML code is generated to grant the user access right to 
the directory. After the attribute matching is completed, 
the scripts process the appropriate Subversion command 
based on the choice of the user.  
B.4. Display of results. The commands and parameters 
for Subversion are embedded in the information that the 
browser transfers to the local scripts. At this step, the 
local scripts call the Subversion command and return the 
result to the browser. Here, HTML tags are embedded 
within the script itself in order to display the contents of 
the result on a browser.  
C. Repository 
 The repository is designed as a local repository using 
the Subversion repository system. This is also where the 
local properties are set up. Depending on the level of 
security, the owner of the repository can assign properties 
along different directory tree levels down to the lowest 
level, the file level. The checked out files are placed in a 
directory whose name is created as combination of the 
user's eduPersonTargetedID and eduPersonAffiliation. 
This allows a unique storage space for each individual 
user in the system.  
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 IV.  DISCUSSION 
 The Shibbolized Subversion system satisfies the goals 
set out for the project. The use of Shibboleth as the 
authentication service provides: 
• Shared repository with access open for trusted 
institutions. The repository has been shared with the 
University of Missouri and the local campus directory. 
• Authentication done by each individual’s institution 
and no extra login name or password needed.  
 In addition, using the combination of Shibboleth 
attributes transfer and Subversion’s repository 
properties, we also satisfy: 
• Authorization is done by a series of attributes and 
matching properties set on the users’ local institution 
accounts and directories in target repositories, 
respectively 
• The degree of fine-grained access control can be 
manipulated as needed.  
• Basic requirements such as security, authenticity, and 
privacy are guaranteed.  
Also, the system can be run on different operating 
systems with web browsers, and no extra installation is 
required on the client side.  
A.   Security 
 The security of a Shibbolized system depends heavily 
on the level of the trust relationship between the Identity 
Provider and the Service Provider. This trust is 
guaranteed by the SAML protocols and the certificates 
assigned to the participants by a common trusted CA. If 
the participants are using different CAs, then all the CAs 
have to be trusted by all parties. In this setting the 
compromise of a single CA will lead to the compromise 
of the whole system.  
 In production federation, the maintenance of a CA is 
very strict. For example, the InCommon Federation has a 
legal contract that requires participant to maintain certain 
security practices such as separation of the machine 
containing the CA from the public network and single 
authority. As a result, the process of getting a certificate 
can be long and troublesome. 
 For testing and experimenting purposes, the Bossie 
certificate allows participants to quickly acquire the 
certificates. However, since the keypass to acquire a 
Bossie certificate is publicly broadcast online, it is not a 
secure method to protect the IdP and Service Provider 
servers.   A production implementation of Shibbolized 
Subversion would have to address this problem by 
requiring that a CA with a high level of security be used 
by all participants in the federation. 
B.  Privacy 
Release of personal attributes is no simple matter. It 
touches complicated issues related to personal privacy, 
and it also raises many who-what-when-why-how 
questions about campus security. These issues can be 
summarized as [16]: 
• Concern from participating institution’s compliance 
and audit offices regarding security and privacy of 
identity data hosted remotely (UT) 
• Demonstrated experience dealing with system-wide 
projects containing sensitive and non-sensitive 
information 
• Completed security questionnaire detailing security 
policies and procedures in place 
• Required Provider-campus staff to sign security policy 
authorization of client campus (CSU). 
C.  Technology 
 The installation of the Shibboleth service provider is 
straightforward.  However, there are several challenges to 
setting up the communication between the identity 
provider and the service provider from different 
institutions.  
 The first challenge comes from the differences in the 
infrastructure between the two institutions. As described 
in section B.2, even within the local campus 
infrastructure, the certificates may not match.  
 Another challenge also arises from the lack of campus 
attribute infrastructure. Some institutions just do not have 
the required security infrastructure that is LDAP-
compatible, and it is difficult for them to upgrade their 
facilities to one. 
 It is difficult for institutions with incompatible 
infrastructures to overcome administrative difficulties in 
seeking approval for a new infrastructure. Even in 
institutions with infrastructure that supports Shibboleth’s 
attribute release scheme, it is a struggle to have the 
infrastructure set up correctly without interfering with 
existing regulations. Often, it is the story of “the chicken 
and the egg,” where the institution requires the users to 
really “want” to use the Shibboleth system before the 
infrastructure is changed, while the users desire to see the 
Shibboleth system in action first before they “want” to 
use it. 
V.  RELATED WORK 
 Grid computing is fast becoming a useful technology 
for large scale research collaborations. For example, the 
Open Science Grid (OSG) [17] has more 50 participating 
institutions from inside and outside of the United States. 
In order to provide adequate access control, the Open 
Science Grid package uses the Virtual Organization 
Membership Service (VOMS) [18] and the Grid User 
Management System (GUMS) [19] for authentication and 
authorization.  
 VOMS is part of the European project Enabling Grid 
for E-SciencE (EGEE). GUMS is developed by the 
Brookhaven National Laboratory. Figure 3 describes the 
working relationship between VOMS and GUMS in the 
OSG software stack. In this procedure, the user first 
requests a proxy certificate from the VOMS server (Step 
1). After authentication, the VOMS server returns a proxy 
certificate containing the encrypted information of the 
user (Steps 2 and 3). Next, the user contacts the Job 
Execution Site and sends the recently acquired proxy 
certificate (Step 4). The GUMS server decodes this 
certificate and performs the authorization step (Steps 5 
and 6). If the user is authorized, a local ID associate with 
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 the user is returned to the Gatekeeper to start executing 
the user’s job under this ID (Steps 7 and 8).  
 The relationship between VOMS and GUMS can be 
compared and contrasted to the relationship between the 
Identity Provider and the Service Provider of Shibboleth.  
For example, VOMS holds user identity information.  In 
order to use the grid, the user authenticates to the VOMS 
server by providing a userid and password that has been 
previously registered with the server.  However, unlike 
the authentication that takes place with the Shibboleth 
Identity Provider, this userid is typically unrelated to any 
userid that may be maintained at the user’s home 
institution and the password is kept separately on the 
VOMS server.  GUMS is a server that matches user 
proxy information to an access control list associated 
with a particular service, in a manner that is similar to the 
Assertion Consumer Service component of the 
Shibboleth Service Provider.. However, communication 
between the Shibboleth Identity Provider and Service 
Provider is in the form of Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML) assertions [5], while the 
communication from VOMS to GUMS is the exchange of 
a user proxy certificate [20]. Furthermore, while 
Shibboleth focuses primarily on user’s attributes, VOMS 
and GUMS usually use user assigned roles for access 
control [20], which may not provide the same level of 
fine-grained access control that is available in the 
Shibboleth architecture. 
 
 
Figure 3: How VOMS and GUMS work together [21] 
VI.  FUTURE WORK 
 Although the system specified here works well in a 
testing environment, there are some limitations and a 
number of challenges and opportunities for improvement 
and future work. 
 Currently, the attributes being used for matching are 
placed in the field eduPersonEntitlement, as this field 
allows multiple values. However, there is a limit within 
the EduPerson scheme definition on the length in 
characters of the eduPersonEntitlement field. It is clear 
that the dependence upon a single field for attribute 
storage does not scale as the number of resources and 
attributes in the federation increases.  In order to avoid 
this problem, there are several possible approaches.  If the 
approach using the single identity and attribute server 
using the eduPerson schema is maintained, then it is 
possible to either implement new eduPerson fields instead 
of putting all the attributes into eduPersonEntitlement, or 
to encode attributes in order to reduce the length yet still 
maintain the versatility of the attributes.  Another, 
perhaps more scalable, alternative is to implement a 
separate attribute repository, perhaps at the federation 
level [21]. 
 An additional limitation of the current implementation 
is the location of ownership permissions of the 
directories.  With the current implementation, the 
administrator of the Shibboleth Service Provider is also 
the owner of the repository. In a production environemnt, 
the directories of a repository may be owned by different 
people, and each of them would want to have a more 
active control on his or her data. It is necessary to provide 
an implementation in which the directory owners can set 
access permissions to users and groups on their own 
directories and files without any action on the part of the 
Service Provider administrator. In additional to giving 
control to the owners, an implementation of this type 
would free the administrators from some of the mundane 
tasks such as setting up properties for the directories. This 
can be done by implementing the commands svn propset 
of Subversion and making the commands available only 
for the owner of the repository.  
 The current design of Shibbolized Subversion allows a 
convenient and quick access to a small shared data 
repository. Anytime a user wants to check out a file or set 
of files, a copy of that data is created on the Subversion 
server. This technique will not scale to very large data 
repositories.  The problem can be alleviated by 
transferring the checked out data to the user’s local site. 
However, a stub of the checked out directory still needs 
to remain at the repository.  The stub can be used to 
guarantee that the Subversion hooks are in place so that 
the check in process can be done later.  
  Currently, this system is set up for users to personally 
access data. However, it is possible in the future to 
further enhance the system of trust so that we can not 
only trust people but also other services. For example, 
user A wants to use the WebMPI service located at 
institution B to process the data located at institution C. 
This model would require a more complicated trust 
relationship between the institutions and would lead to 
more cooperation opportunities.  
 The source code for this project is available at 
http://archie.csce.uark.edu/gpn/ [22] [23]. 
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